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1. Laws of Nature and Explanation: Some Preliminaries
The intuitive pull towards accepting subsumption under natural laws as a form of explanation is
very strong. However, the idea that subsumption under laws is explanatory famously fell on hard
times with the onslaught of counterexamples to the deductive-nomological account; especially since
that account spells out the intuition that laws can explain in a very natural and straightforward
way by thinking of explanations as arguments that proceed (essentially) from laws. Among the
counterexamples, the problem of explanatory non-symmetry is particularly troubling.
Whether or not one takes the relation of explanation to be by its nature asymmetric (and I do
not), there are many cases to illustrate that explanation is not symmetric. Several such cases are by
now familiar. For example, while it seems as if the height of a flagpole can play a role in explaining
the length of the shadow it casts, it does not seem as if the length of the shadow can play this role
in explaining the height of the flagpole.1 Examples of explanations that are not symmetrical are
found throughout the sciences and are present both in cases that explicitly involve approximations
and in instances of what could be taken to be foundational theories. For example, while the length
of a simple pendulum might be taken to be part of an explanation of its period, the reverse does
not hold. Similarly, while the acceleration experienced by one of two gravitating bodies can be
explained by the existence of a distant mass, the mass of that distant body cannot similarly be
explained by the acceleration.
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These cases are troubling for the deductive-nomological account since the law that allows us to
derive the length of the shadow from the height of the flagpole equally allows us to derive the height
of the flagpole from the length of the shadow (and similarly for the other two cases). Although
the failure of explanation to be symmetric is a problem directly only for the deductive-nomological
account, it raises doubts about whether any account that allows non-causal dependencies, such
as nomological dependencies, to play the central explanatory role is viable. Lipton nicely sum-
marises the worry. In abandoning the deductive-nomological account all non-causal foundations for
explanation, such as nomological ones, have come to be seen as suspect.
The existence of non-causal explanations show that a causal model of explanation
cannot be complete. One reaction would be to attempt to expand the notion of
causation to some broader notion of ‘determination’ that would encompass the non-
causal cases (Ruben 1990: 230–3). This approach has merit, but it will be difficult
to come up with such a notion that we understand even as well as causation, without
falling into the relation of deductive determination, which will expose the model to
many of the objections to the deductive-nomological model.2
The ability to solve the problem of explanatory non-symmetry in a simple and elegant way is one
of the main attractions of a causal account of explanation. Here laws can do explanatory work, but
they are no longer independently explanatory. Rather, they can do explanatory work in so far as
they are causal laws.3 For example, Strevens’s account tries to remain as metaphysically neutral as
possible, but when it comes to how the account handles explanatory non-symmetry this neutrality
runs out.
All religions, however ecumenical, need someone to burn. And there is, not surpris-
ingly, a view of the nature of causation that is ruled out by even my ecumenism. I
have in mind an emergent view of causation, on which there are no causal relations
at the level of fundamental physics . . . To abandon this possibility is no loss for
the proponent of the causal approach to explanation, however, since it is the one
view of causation that clearly cannot solve the problem of explanatory asymmetry.
2Peter Lipton. Inference to the Best Explanation, second edition. Routledge, 1991/2004, p 32.
3This line of reasoning is prominent in several recent sophisticated accounts of causal explanation such as those of
James Woodward. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, 2003, chapter
6 and Michael Strevens. Depth: An Account Of Scientific Explanation. Harvard University Press, 2008, chapter 7.
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. . . [W]hat I assume in the way of causal relations is . . . just what is needed, and no
more, to provide a causal resolution of the explanatory asymmetries.4
This solution is extremely elegant. However, there are also many examples of explanations that
are, at least plausibly, non-causal.5 This may not seem to be a problem for causal accounts that are
willing to be pluralist about explanation and to claim to have accounted only for causal explanation.6
I have argued elsewhere that pluralism does not come cheaply.7 Roughly and in brief, the difficulty is
that causal accounts solve the problem of explanatory non-symmetry by demanding that only causal
information is explanatory (at least within a non-ad hoc delineated domain such as all explanation
of physical events). Without this exclusivity we no longer have a solution to the problem that
certain law-based derivations are non-explanatory. All that we would be allowed to conclude is
that such law-based derivations are not causal explanations. Without assuming causal explanatory
exclusivity they could be explanations nonetheless. An explanatory pluralist who rejects causal
explanatory exclusivity needs a non-causal solution to the problem of explanatory non-symmetry
for these cases.
I will argue that we have the resources to solve the problem of non-symmetry without invoking
causal notions. This will not rescue the deductive-nomological account. However, it will rehabilitate
one of the central ideas from that account by showing that laws of nature can provide the basis for
explanation without running afoul of the problem of explanatory non-symmetry.
The challenge of accounting for particular explanatory asymmetries is only one of several dif-
ficulties that faced the deductive-nomological account. Yet, I take the problem of explanatory
non-symmetry to be the most serious challenge to the general idea that laws of nature can do
independent explanatory work and to be the problem that most strongly favours causal account
of explanation. In order to address counterexamples put forward to the deductive aspect of the
4Michael Strevens. Depth: An Account Of Scientific Explanation. Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 34–35.
5For some recent discussions see for example Collin Rice. Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and Scien-
tific Explanation. Nouˆs, DOI: 10.1111/nous.12042, forthcoming; Marc Lange. What Makes a Scientific Explanation
Distinctively Mathematical? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(3):485–511, 2013, and Alisa Bokulich.
Reexamining the Quantum-Classical Relation: Beyond Reductionism and Pluralism. Cambridge University Press,
2008. For a discussion of many cases and a defence of the claim that all explanations of particular events are causal
see Bradford Skow. Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)? British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, 65(3):445–467, 2014.
6I take this to be the view of Woodward and Strevens.
7See Lina Jansson. Causal Theories of Explanation and the Challenge of Explanatory Disagreement. Philosophy of
Science, 81(3):332–348, 2014.
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deductive-nomological account it is possible to appeal to what Woodward8 calls “the hidden struc-
ture strategy”.9 For many of the other counterexamples one might hope for a solution by simply
being more careful about what counts as a law, and, in particular, by being careful to note any
implicit ceteris paribus clauses and/or conditions of application.10 However, no matter how suc-
cessful these strategies turn out to be, on their own these strategies do not help with the problem
of explanatory non-symmetry. After all, there will still be cases where the law is bona fide, ceteri
are pares, and the conditions favour applicability so that the derivation can go ahead (or else the
account would leave us with no explanations at all), but if this is the case for the derivation that
is explanatory then it will be the case for the derivation that is non-explanatory too. Without a
solution to the problem of explanatory non-symmetry law-based accounts cannot even get off the
ground.
Before going further, let me pause briefly to clarify the kind of account that I will go on to present
and that I take the traditional models to be. First, the concern is mainly with explaining why events,
regularities, etc., occur or why they have certain features (as opposed to offering explanations as
mere reasoning heuristics, etc.). Second, within accounts of explanation there is a descriptive project
of trying to give conditions that capture our explanatory practices, as they actually are, and also
a normative project of trying to provide conditions for what our explanatory practices ought to
(perhaps ideally) be like. I take the standard models to give prescriptive accounts, and that is what
I will be doing too. This does not mean that the descriptive project is irrelevant to these accounts
or to mine. I take them and myself to be involved in a project of spelling out what it is that we aim
towards in our explanatory practices. Rather than being understood as imposing norms external
to the practice the project is better seen as an explication of the normative commitments that we
already employ (although perhaps not explicitly) together with the assumption that our practices
are not thoroughly and radically misguided (at least in central and well-understood cases).
8James Woodward. Scientific Explanation. In E. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/scientific-explanation/, 2003/2014.
9See for example Peter Railton. Probability, explanation, and information. Synthese, 48(2):233–256, 1981 for the use
of ideal texts or Philip Kitcher. Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. In P. Kitcher and
W. Salmon, editors, Scientific Explanation, volume XIII of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pages
410–505. University of Minnesota Press, 1989, section 5, for a defence of deductive chauvinism.
10In particular, one might try to avoid many of the problems of causal pre-emption, common cause and at least some
of the cases of explanatory irrelevancies in this way. David-Hillel Ruben. Explaining Explanation. Routledge, 1990
considers, but rejects, this strategy in chapter VI. However, Ruben’s discussion is operating under the assumption
that the notion of law should respect logical empiricist sensibilities.
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Moreover, I will primarily be focused on canonical deterministic explanation. I take there to be
many and important norms of explanation that have to do with idealisations, simplifications, etc.,
that I will not address here. I will not argue for the merit of such an approach independently;
here the proof of the pudding is in the eating. I will simply display the virtues of the approach
by showing that there are fairly intuitive criteria that we impose on such explanations and that
understanding these enable us to tackle the problem of non-symmetry for many non-canonical
explanations too. Finally, since I do not think that our judgements of explanatory asymmetry
in the specific cases commonly invoked in the literature merit us drawing the conclusion that
explanation is always asymmetrical, I take it to be enough to successfully address the problem of
explanatory non-symmetry if I can show how to account for the judgements of asymmetry in these
cases.
2. What Laws Are versus What Laws Do
The first challenge encountered when trying to address the role of laws in explanation is the
wide range of views about what laws of nature are. I will not rely on any particular such theory.
I will instead be focused on what laws do. That is, I will be concerned with the role that they
play within our theories.11 This strategy raises an immediate worry. Since I will remain silent on
what the laws of nature metaphysically are, it is possible that our best such account will end up
making use of the notion of explanation. I think that we have some defeasible reason to think that
this is not the case. Judgements that separate laws from accidents do not seem to require us to
make explanatory judgements. After all, it is not the case that any event, property, state, etc., in
a nomological relationship can explain any other that it is so related to (as we have seen in the
asymmetry counterexamples facing the deductive-nomological account). Finally, even if our best
account of laws ultimately does have to rely on judgements about explanatoriness, the account
offered of explanation in this paper will still be an informative (although not reductive) one. In
many debates over explanation the status of the putative law as a law is not in question.12
The assumption about the role of laws within a theory that the rest of this paper will rely on is
this: laws allow us to make inferences beyond those of deductive logic. I take it that the laws of
a given theory are of particular interest at least partially because they give us information about
11John Roberts. The Law-Governed Universe. Oxford University Press, 2008 builds an account of laws around one
conception of the role that laws play in our theories, but this will not be required for the account that I give here.
12Moreover, similar assumptions are in play in causal accounts of explanation.
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the kind of inferential moves that the theory sanctions. This is reminiscent of the notion of laws of
nature as “inference tickets” that Ryle13 mentions. However, I will only rely on this being one of
the roles that laws play. I make no claim as to the primacy of this role.
With this in place, let me now go on to consider some restrictions that our theories and practice
typically impose on the inferential use that we can make of what is stated as laws within the theory.
2.1. The role of conditions of application. Take as an example a version of the second law
of Newtonian mechanics, namely, the claim that force, ~F , is given by the product of mass and
acceleration, m~a. Although the law is often presented in this form, the introduction to the law will
come with significant clarifications. First, this law only allows us to move from finding out that the
net force on some body, m, has some magnitude and direction to the claim that m~a has the same
magnitude and direction.14 In thinking of this law as licensing certain inferences we can imagine
that there is a rule, relative to Newtonian mechanics, that tells us that we are allowed to move
from ~Fnet to m~a (and sometimes vice versa).
Similarly, when spelling out the inferences that are licensed by the law of gravity we have to
take some care in how we understand ~F = −GMm|r|2 rˆ.15 We can, for example, specify that we
are dealing with only the component of the force from the gravitational interaction of point-like
masses m and M (the option that I will take here). In this case we should think of the law as
~Fgravity (from the m−M interaction) = −GMm|r|2 rˆ.16
In order to use the two laws above to derive the claim that ~a = −GM|r|2 rˆ, we need some additional
assumptions. In particular, we need to assume that we have two massive gravitating bodies where
the force from the gravitational interaction is the only net force acting on the bodies and that these
bodies can be treated as point-like masses. In general it will simply be false that, for example,
when the acceleration of some mass m is non-existent (set to 0) then the value of the other mass,
M , is set to 0 too.
When we try to understand the role that the laws are playing, it is crucial to look to the broader
theory and the conditions of application. It would be a mistake to think that we had shown that
13Gilbert Ryle. The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson/Routledge, 1949/2009, p 105.
14We would have to be even more careful if we do not assume that it is the net force on some body with constant
mass that we are dealing with.
15I am using the convention that rˆ is a unit vector.
16My approach here is very much in line with that of Carl Hempel. Provisoes: A problem concerning the inferential
function of scientific theories. Erkenntnis, 28(2):147–164, 1988, p 151.
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~a = −GM|r|2 rˆ was false by looking at a system that is subject to a force contributing to the net force
that is not gravitational. Rather, ~a = −GM|r|2 rˆ simply does not apply to such a system.17 Moreover,
as this example illustrates, what would allow us to combine two laws in a derivation might demand
assumptions that are different from the ones (if any) that are required in understanding the role
that each typically plays (here one such additional assumption is that the only net force is the force
from the gravitational interaction).18
On its own this is not a novel claim. Cartwright in particular has long argued for the crucial
importance of such considerations (although in more general terms than I accept). Moreover, she
sees them as raising a problem for law-based explanations.
For most cases, either we have a law that purports to cover, but cannot explain
because it is acknowledged to be false, or we have a law that does not cover. Either
way, it is bad for the covering-law picture.19
Unlike Cartwright, I do not think that the desiderata of explanation and application are in
conflict. My argument throughout the rest of this article will attempt to show that the conditions
of application are part of our explanatory practices, and they will play a crucial role in allowing
explanations based on laws to evade the non-symmetry problem.
3. Flagpoles and their shadows, masses and accelerations, the lengths and
periods of simple pendula
With the warning to pay attention to conditions of application in place, we can now move on
to look at some of the central examples of explanatory asymmetry in the literature. First, let us
revisit the well-worn case of the flagpole and the shadow.
3.1. Flagpoles and shadows. Let y be a variable for the height of the flagpole and H be the
height of the specific flagpole in question. Similarly, let x be the variable for the length of the
shadow and L the length of the specific shadow. Finally, let z be a variable for the angle the sun
makes with the horizon at the location of the flagpole and the shadow, and let a be a specific such
17For reasons that John Earman and John Roberts. “Ceteris Paribus”, There Is No Problem of Provisos. Synthese,
118(3):439–478, 1999 present, I do not think that all laws of physics are ceteris paribus ones. This is why I am
treating these as conditions of application rather than as ceteris paribus clauses.
18Notice that even if we take the law of gravity and the second law to apply unrestrictedly this point still stands for
the derived law.
19Nancy Cartwright. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983/2002, p 45–46.
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angle. Let us also assume that none of H, L and a are zero and that H = L tan a.
Figure 1. Flagpole and its shadow
putative explanation 1.
Relation: y = x tan z
Particular fact: x = L
Particular fact: z = a
Explanandum: y = H
putative explanation 2.
Relation: x = y/ tan z
Particular fact: y = H
Particular fact: z = a
Explanandum: x = L
In putative explanation 1 the height of the flagpole is derived from the length of the shadow but
is not explained by the length of the shadow, while, so the story goes, in putative explanation 2
the length of the shadow is both derived and explained by the height of the flagpole.
The relation that is playing the role of a law here is not straightforwardly recognisable as a law
of any particular theory. What may be taken to be a law is that light moves in straight lines and
from this, together with other assumptions, we can apply the general trigonometric relationship.
We also know that when it comes to applying this relationship to flagpoles and their shadows there
are a number of conditions that we impose in order to take the application to be legitimate. Most
obviously, we know that the relationship will be misleading when there is no source of light (say
because of a solar eclipse or because the sun is below the horizon).20 After all, even if the length of
the shadow is 0 in these cases, we know that the height of the flagpole is not. This is not a problem
20There are several other assumptions needed, but focusing on this one will be sufficient to make the point clear.
8
that we typically run up against when we try to apply the trigonometric relationship to flagpoles
and shadows because we have a rough sense of when this relation is applicable to real flagpoles and
their shadows and when it is not.
Of course, there will be cases where this condition is fulfilled and the derivation both in putative
explanation 1 and putative explanation 2 can go ahead. This is what gives rise to the problem for
the deductive-nomological account. However, the condition of application gives rise to a difference
in the patterns of counterfactual sensitivity in the two cases. When the condition holds, we know
how the length of the shadow varies with the height of the flagpole. Moreover, we also know
something about how the actual value of the length of the shadow (in this case a non-zero value)
would vary when this condition of applicability is not fulfilled. In this case, when the assumption
that there is a light source fails then there will not be a shadow. However, this is not the case for
the height of the flagpole. The height of the flagpole is not sensitive to violations of the condition
of applicability. Even when the assumption that there is a light source is violated the height of the
flagpole would not vary.
So far, I have not relied on any information that has to (even though it can) be understood
causally. After all, simple observation (and generalisation of observation) allows us to conclude
that flagpoles do not change their height, for example, at night. While the conditions of application
are ones that the length of the shadow seems to be (counterfactually) sensitive to, this is not the
case for the height of the flagpole. This will provide the foundation for my diagnosis of these cases
in the next section.
However, before moving on to consider the general case, let me briefly note how this applies to
other common cases of explanatory asymmetry and show that it is not a feature peculiar to the
case of flagpoles and shadows.
3.2. Masses and accelerations. Asymmetries when it comes to specific explanatory relations
are pervasive. I have already noted that if we have a system with two gravitating bodies then we
take the presence of a distant body to explain the acceleration that the other body experiences.
However, we do not take this acceleration to explain the mass of the distant body. Here too there
is a difference that stems from the counterfactual sensitivity to the conditions of applicability. In
section 2.1 I argued that in order to make the reasoning in either direction legitimate we need to
assume that there are no forces other than the one from the from the gravitational interaction
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acting on the bodies.21 If there was another force acting on the mass in question, we know that
the acceleration of this mass would be sensitive to this and it would, typically, be different from
its supposed actual value. However, this is not the case for the reverse direction. The mass of the
distant body is not sensitive to the existence of another net force acting on the other body. Here
too we have a difference in sensitivity to violations of the assumptions required for the (in this case
derived) law to apply.
3.3. Lengths and periods of simple pendula. We find this pattern repeated yet again when it
comes to the conditions required in order to make use of the simplified (and approximate) equation
governing the behaviour of a simple pendulum. Here (like in the flagpole case) we are making
many assumptions, and it will be enough for my purposes to focus on a few of them. The simplified
behaviour is described by T ≈ 2pi
√
L
g , where T is the period, L is the length and g is the local
acceleration due to gravity. The first feature of this equation to stress is that it is an approximation
for small swings and that it only holds in the absence of other forces such as air resistance. Here
too we find a difference in the sensitivity to the conditions of application between the period T and
the length L. Neither the presence of air resistance nor large swings would indicate a different value
for the length of the pendulum. The length, unlike the period, does not generally seem sensitive to
violations of the conditions of application that the law comes with.
4. Law-based dependence
The difference in the counterfactual sensitivity on the conditions of applicability that I have
noted in the cases above points us in the direction of a systematic solution. In the rest of this
section I will show how sensitivity to the applicability criteria for the laws matters for explanatory
purposes.
The basic intuition that I will make use of is very simple. The difference between mere description
of a phenomenon and an explanation of that same phenomenon lies in whether information about
what the phenomenon depends on has been provided. For example, the length of the shadow does
not explain the height of the flagpole since the height of the flagpole does not depend on the length
of the shadow. However, the height of the flagpole can explain the length of the shadow since the
length of the shadow does depend on the height of the flagpole. Similarly, if the stability of the
21Or if we treat the derived law as an approximation then we should demand that there are no other non-negligible
forces.
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planetary orbits depends on the dimensionality of space-time then the stability of the planetary
orbits is (at least in part) explained by the dimensionality of space-time.22
Hopefully this sounds rather commonsensical, so it is worth noting how this driving intuition
differs from that of some other accounts of explanation. In particular, this motivation differs from
the one in the deductive-nomological account where to explain is to show why the phenomenon was
to be expected given the laws of nature. It is also distinct from the motivation for unificationist
accounts, such as those of Friedman23 and Kitcher24. Here to explain is to reduce the number
of types of phenomena that have to be taken to be brute. Finally, although it is similar to the
motivating intuition behind causal accounts of explanation, the dependence employed is broader
than causal dependency (as the example of planetary orbits and the dimensionality of spacetime
indicates).25
At this point it would be tempting to take the relevant notion of dependence to simply be coun-
terfactual dependence. I was clearly invoking counterfactual scenarios in the examples throughout
section 3. This is, of course, right, but the dependence is not simple counterfactual dependence.
Counterfactual dependence is neither necessary nor sufficient for explanatory dependence. When
we consider what it is that we are trying to capture, this is not surprising. When we explain the
event, state, or property of an event, etc. b by the event, state or property of an event, etc. a by
a law, we are interested in what this law tells us about the dependence of b on a.26 The notion of
dependence is a modal one, so information about what would have happened in other circumstances
22This example is noted by James Woodward. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford
University Press, 2003, p 220–221 and is discussed by Paul Ehrenfest. In what way does it become manifest in the
fundamental laws of physics that space has three dimensions? Proceedings of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts
and Sciences, Amsterdam, 20(1):200–209, 1918; John D. Barrow. Dimensionality. Physical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, 310(1512):337–346, 1983 and Craig Callender.
Answers in search of a question: “proofs” of the tri-dimensionality of space. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics, 36(1):113–136, 2005. If the dimensionality of space-time does not depend on the stability of the
planetary orbits (which seems plausible) then the stability of the planetary orbits does not explain the dimensionality
of space-time.
23Michael Friedman. Explanation and Scientific Understanding. The Journal of Philosophy, 71(1):5–19, 1974.
24Philip Kitcher. Explanatory Unification. Philosophy of Science, 48(4):507–531, 1981 and Philip Kitcher. Explana-
tory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. In P. Kitcher and W. Salmon, editors, Scientific Explanation,
volume XIII of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pages 410–505. University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
25There are other such notions around. For example, Jaegwon Kim. Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical
Dependence. Philosophical Issues, 5(Truth and Rationality):51–69, 1994 includes mereological dependence in addition
to causal dependence and takes the relevant notion to be asymmetrical and transitive. However, as I will argue
below, I do not think that the kind of dependence Kim discusses will do the work required here. David-Hillel Ruben.
Explaining Explanation. Routledge, 1990, p 230–233, also suggests an expansion from causal relations in terms of the
relations that can do explanatory work, but Ruben does not go on to develop this account in detail.
26I am leaving it open for now what the proper relata of laws should be.
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(and so some counterfactuals) is relevant. However, the straightforward counterfactual about what
would have happened had a not obtained is not. An example that is modified (in order to ex-
press a counterfactual) but that otherwise parallels Sanford’s27 discussion about dependence and
conditionals illustrates this.
Example: If Jim had been fired then Bill would have been fired too.
Many different circumstances could be imagined that would serve to make the counterfactual state-
ment true, but only some of them involve Bill’s job depending on Jim’s. Continuing the adaption
of Sanford’s case and discussion, it could be that Jim is the son of the employer and only if the
company went bankrupt, bringing with it the firing of all employees (including Bill), would Jim be
fired.28 Or perhaps Bill is a terrible worker, known to be disliked by his employer, and if anyone
at all were to be fired then he would be sure to be the first one to go.29 In neither of these cases
does Bill’s firing depend on Jim’s. In the first scenario they have a common cause: the insolvency
of the company. In the second case they do not even have to have a common cause. The truth of
the counterfactual is guaranteed by our knowledge that, whatever the cause of Jim’s being fired,
the employer would rather have fired Bill, so if Jim was fired then either Bill had already been
let go for incompetence or he was fired for the same reason that Jim was. However, if Bill’s job
is contingent on Jim’s job, perhaps because Bill is Jim’s personal assistant, then Bill losing his
job does depend on Jim losing his.30 As Sanford notes, these differences are not visible in the
counterfactual statement above. For necessity, we have examples of preemption where causal and
explanatory relations seem to hold, but the corresponding counterfactual does not.
Rather, the dependence required in the case of law-based explanation is a special kind of coun-
terfactual dependence where we ask, roughly, whether the law in question is such that it guarantees
that b holds when a does and that b does not when a does not.31 The requirement that it is the
law that guarantees the relevant counterfactuals rules out cases where the law is simply an idle
27David Sanford. If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. Routledge, 1989/2003, p 192 forward.
Sanford’s cases do not concern counterfactuals, but they can easily be adapted to do so (as Sanford notes). It is
possible to make the same point more quickly, but less clearly, by noting that D. Lewis. Causation. The Journal of
Philosophy, 70(17):556–567, 1973 has to rule out backtracking counterfactuals.
28David Sanford. If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. Routledge, 1989/2003, p 193, case 4.
29David Sanford. If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. Routledge, 1989/2003, p 193, case 5.
30David Sanford. If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning. Routledge, 1989/2003, p 193, case 1.
31Note that even if we take the view of Marc Lange. Laws & Lawmakers: Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of
Nature. Oxford University Press, 2009 that subjunctive facts are foundational, we do not need to deny that we can
ask questions about and evaluate such counterfactual scenarios. We do, however, have to be careful not to read the
“guarantee” as a statement of metaphysical fundamentality.
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tag-along.32 For counterfactual dependence typically the only non-actual world relevant to the
evaluation of whether b depends on a is the closest (or set of closest) possible not-a worlds. For
nomological dependence all and only those worlds where the law guaranteeing dependence holds are
relevant to the evaluation. In principle these sets of worlds need not have any common members at
all (although we expect that they often will since we expect that the closest possible not-a world
will typically be one where the actual laws of nature hold).
Before we can put the notion of nomological dependence to use in an account of explanation
there is a final complication and extension of the use that I need to address. That is why the first
statement was a rough one. So far I have only talked of there being one law guaranteeing the
dependence of one event (or property, state, etc.) on another one. In general we expect there to be
a collection of laws that together guarantee that one event (or property, state, etc.) depends on a
collection of other events (properties, states, etc.). So far the extension is straightforward. However,
as soon as we are dealing with dependence on a collection of phenomena there are two different ways
in which this could happen. It could be that the laws guarantee dependence between the individual
events (or properties, states, etc.) and the phenomenon to be explained. However, the laws can
also do so between the phenomenon to be explained and a general condition instantiated by the
various particular events, properties, states, etc., involved. In the second case the phenomenon
to be explained directly depends on the general condition and indirectly on the component events
(etc.) that instantiate it.
The second case is typical for nomological dependence. Laws typically do not relate individual
events (etc.) directly. Instead, when we speak of dependence on a particular event, or a trope, or
the object that instantiates the property, etc., the dependence is indirect. For example, when we
speak of the final velocity of a ball with a certain mass depending on being hit by another ball
with a certain mass and velocity in a certain kind of collision, etc., we do so while knowing that
the law in question does not relate that specific ball to any other specific ball. Rather, the final
velocity depends on there being an impact of a certain general kind. We take the velocity to depend
on the specific balls and their specific properties since they instantiate the general condition. So,
for example, we might say that the velocity after the collision depends on the mass and the initial
32This formulation is deliberately different from the requirement in Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim. Studies in the
Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Science, 15(2):135–175, 1948 that the law plays an essential role in the derivation.
The difference will not be very important in this paper, but it is important in general and in particular when dealing
with necessary existents (such as those found in mathematics).
13
velocity of the two balls even though the law only gives us a general relation between masses, initial
velocities, and final ones in elastic collisions.
Finally, notice that this breaks the symmetry of the earlier, rough, formulation of nomological
dependence. When we are dealing with the explanation of particular events, states, etc., it will
in general be the case that we are explaining one event (state, etc.) by a collection of events
(states, etc.) that instantiate a general condition that the target event (etc.) depends on. From
this explanation we cannot infer that the dependence holds in the reverse direction. After all,
the particular event (state, etc.) depends directly on a general condition and indirectly on the
particular events (states, etc.) that instantiate it. This general condition is not itself an event or
state (at least assuming some mild constraints on what is allowed to count as such).33
With this notion of dependence in place, the time has now come for explanation. The starting
point is straightforward; the notion of dependence that I relied on in the intuitive motivating claim
that to explain a phenomenon is to show what it depends on, is, in the cases of section 3, nomological
dependence. Spelling out this motivating intuition a little more carefully—with the caveat that I
will only be concerned with deterministic, full and canonical explanation here—we can say that
a phenomenon is explained by some phenomena and some laws between phenomena when those
laws guarantee the dependence of the target phenomenon on the phenomena. To give a law-based
explanation is then to describe those laws and show how they ensure the dependence of the target
phenomenon on the phenomena doing the explaining. Even with the caveat in place this notion of
nomological explanation is interesting since it gives us a way of understanding what it is that we
aim towards when we give law-based explanations. This will give us a stronger notion than one
that we typically actually fulfil, but I will argue that it nonetheless give us a way to understand
the asymmetry of the examples in section 3. In particular, it will allow us to understand the
importance of whether or not the target phenomenon to be explained is sensitive to the conditions
of application of the laws in question.
We are now finally in a position to give a more systematic diagnosis of the cases in section
3. If we assume that we are aiming to give information about a collection of laws that together
guarantee the dependence of what is to be explained on what is doing the explaining then we have
good reasons to think that some, and only some, instances of derivation from the laws in section 3
33I illustrate this in more detail on page 15.
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give us partial information about this collection of other laws and the dependence guaranteed by
them.
For example, we have good reason to think that the application of the trigonometric relation in
the flagpole and shadow case is not giving us partial information about a collection of laws that
guarantees that the height of the flagpole depends on the length of the shadow. We have good
reason to believe this since we know something about what the conditions of applicability of the
trigonometric relationship are, and we have good reason to think that the height is not sensitive to
a failure of these conditions of applicability.
What we would, ideally, like is something that fits the sketch below.
Explanandum: The height of the flagpole y is H.
Particulars: The angle z is a and the length of the shadow x is L.
General condition: The length of the shadow x and the angle z instantiate the general
condition x tan z = H.
Laws: There are laws L1 . . . Ln such that they
(1) license the inference from the general condition obtaining to the explanandum obtaining
(and a spelling out of how they do so).
(2) license the inference from a failure of the general condition to obtain to the failure of
the explanandum to obtain (and a spelling out of how they do so).
We have good reason to think that we do not only lack the ability to spell this sketch out in detail
but that there is no way to spell it out. The trigonometric law does not describe the relationship
between flagpoles and shadows without restrictions. One of the conditions of application of the
trigonometric law is that there has to be a light source present, and when this is violated we find
that the height of the flagpole is unchanged. This gives us good (but not infallible) evidence to
support the conclusion that there is no collection of laws L1 . . . Ln available to fill out the sketch
above. After all, this seeming lack of sensitivity to the condition of applicability indicates that we
have not merely been unable to specify in more detail the laws that govern the dependence of the
height of the flagpole on the presence or absence of light but that the presence or absence of light
(and of a shadow) are not relevant factors at all.
In the case of the period and the length of the pendulum we know that there are situations
where what we call the law (for the simple pendulum) has not been violated, but simply does not
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apply, and we know that in these situations the length would be at its actual value even when the
period is not. This gives us good reason to hold that the law in question does not provide us with
information about some part of a collection of laws that together ensure that the length depends
on the period. After all, we know of situations where this appears to be false.34 Similarly, we have
good reason to hold that the derived law of the acceleration experienced by a body does not provide
us with information about some part of a collection of laws that ensure that the mass depends on
the acceleration. After all, here too we know that this appears to be false when the conditions of
application are not fulfilled.
However, things are different when it comes to the length of the shadow, the acceleration of the
body, and the period of the pendulum. Without knowing more about the specific counterfactual
scenario, we cannot in all of these cases specify exactly what will happen when the conditions of
application of the law fails; however, we do know that their values will, in general, differ from the
assumed actual values. For example, when there is no light source then there will be no shadow,
when there is a different net force then the body will move differently, when there are dissipative
forces present then the period will not be independent of time, etc. Here we can take ourselves to
have partial information about a collection of laws that guarantee that the length, the acceleration
and the period will be sensitive to variations in the height, the mass, and the length respectively.35
Moreover, none of these observations require us to reason causally. Although we can, of course,
do so, simple observation is enough for us to know that when there is no light source then there
is no shadow and that the length of the pendulum is not affected by stopping the swing of the
pendulum, etc. In the case of Newton’s laws of motion and the universal law of gravity we get
the relevant conditions of application for the derived law from the theoretical understanding of the
more basic laws. Here we can also have empirical support for the laws although it is of a much
more sophisticated kind.36
34Of course there is a possibility of being deceived about this if we are unlucky enough to live in a systematically
deceptive world. This, however, is not a feature peculiar to law-based explanation. We can similarly be deceived
about the causal structure of a situation.
35I am simplifying somewhat here by using the term “sensitive”. We know that, for example, the height of the
flagpole does not explain the length of the shadow on its own. Rather, it is part of the instantiation of a general
condition that explains the length of the shadow. So the laws really guarantee that the length of the shadow depends
on this condition directly and only indirectly on the actual height (and similarly for the other two cases).
36For a recent detailed discussion of how we can come to have such evidence see for example William Harper. Isaac
Newton’s Scientific Method: Turning Data into Evidence about Gravity and Cosmology. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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Now we are in a position to revisit how the view presented here relates to the traditional ac-
counts of explanation. As I stressed earlier, the motivation is closest to the motivation behind
causal accounts (such as Woodward’s) in its focus on the notion of dependence. However, unlike
causal accounts it is focused on nomological dependence and does not tackle failures of explanatory
symmetry by appeal to causal asymmetry. Finally, in this last respect, this accounts invokes similar
considerations to those developed by the unificationist account. Kitcher also considers the absence
of light, etc., in accounting for the failure of symmetry in the flagpole and shadow case.
. . . [T]he shadow pattern cannot be instantiated in all the cases in which we pro-
vide origin-and-development explanations. Take any unilluminated object. It casts
no shadow. Hence we cannot instantiate the shadow pattern to explain its dimen-
sions.37
However, unlike in the unificationist account, these kinds of considerations are now merely evidence
that we have for or against nomological dependence. There is no need to compare the overall
unificatory power of an “origin-and-development” pattern versus a “shadow” pattern.
A second example raised by Teller38 will clarify the difference. Bromberger39 also notes that the
failure of symmetry has to do “. . . with the fact that whereas the period would not have been what
it is if the length had not been what it is, the length would have been what it is whether the bob had
been oscillating or not”. Teller objects to Bromberger’s way of capturing this intuition. Teller notes
that it falters (in among other cases) when it comes to accounting for why the dispositional period
of a pendulum does not explain the length of the pendulum (although it has this dispositional
period whether it is swinging or not). Kitcher tackles this objection on behalf of unificationist
accounts.
Someone may . . . suggest that we can construct derivations of the dimensions of
bodies from specifications of their dispositional periods, thereby generating an ar-
gument pattern which can be applied as generally as that instantiated in origin and
37Philip Kitcher. Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. In P. Kitcher and W. Salmon, edi-
tors, Scientific Explanation, volume XIII of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pages 410–505. University
of Minnesota Press, 1989, p 485.
38Paul Teller. On Why-Questions. Nouˆs, 8(4):371–380, 1974.
39Sylvain Bromberger. Why-Questions. In R. Colodny, editor, Mind and Cosmos, volume 3 of University of Pittsburg
Series in the Philosophy of Science, pages 86–111. University of Pittsburg Press, 1966, 106.
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development explanations. This suggestion is mistaken. There are some objects—
such as the Earth and the Crab Nebula—which could not be pendulums, and for
which the notion of a dispositional period makes no sense. Hence, the argument pat-
terned proposed cannot entirely supplant our origin and development derivations,
and, in consequence, acceptance of it would fail to achieve the best unification of
our beliefs.40
On the view in this paper, the first question to ask is whether or not a simple pendulum law dealing
with dispositional periods, T (dispositional) ≈ 2pi
√
L
g , would hold generally. As Kitcher argues,
the answer to this question is clearly no.41 There are objects that do not have dispositional periods
and yet have lengths (or more generally dimensions). Teller’s question is whether we should take
the dispositional periods of pendula to explain their lengths. Since the unificationist account works
by demanding maximal unification, it is enough for a unificationist view to note that such a pattern
would fail to be as generally applicable as other competitor patterns.42 This is not part of the view
that I have put forward. On the view in this article we can still ask whether or not the dispositional
period can explain the length for pendula (objects with dispositional periods). Although Kitcher
is right that T (dispositional) ≈ 2pi
√
L
g cannot apply generally, we can associate a condition of
application with the dispositional version of the simple pendulum law. Namely, that it only applies
to pendula (whether swinging or not). Once we have noted this restriction in application we need
to ask if the length is sensitive to violations of this condition of applicability. That is, is the length
of the object sensitive to whether or not the object under consideration is a pendulum? We have
good reason to think that the answer is no. No restrictions are posed on the length of an object
by it not falling under the class of pendula. In contrast, the length looks like it can still explain
the dispositional period via the dispositional simple pendulum law. The dispositional period is
sensitive to this condition of application. The dispositional period of an object is (by definition)
sensitive to whether or not the object is a pendulum.
40Philip Kitcher. Explanatory Unification. Philosophy of Science, 48(4):507–531, 1981, p 525.
41The full view in Philip Kitcher. Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. In P. Kitcher and
W. Salmon, editors, Scientific Explanation, volume XIII of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pages
410–505. University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp 484–87, also appeals to the idea of not allowing gerrymandered
properties. The account in this paper, as well as causal accounts, also requires such a view.
42This “winner-takes-all” aspect of unficationist accounts has been criticised by James Woodward. Making Things
Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, 2003, p 367.
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This brings me to a final problem that Teller raises when evaluating future promising avenues
for understanding explanation.
Bromberger’s account and for that matter Hempel’s account of explanations are
already not purely formal; for they rely on the concept of lawlikeness which is now
widely recognised not to be a purely formal notion. It is natural to suspect that
there are further non-formal aspects of contexts of discourse and explanation which
are relevant to explanation and the relation of certain questions to their answers.
By way of illustration, consider again the counterexample . . . involving a pole. It
is possible to describe sufficiently bizarre contexts in which . . . a pole’s dispositions
for relations of physical geometry might be taken to explain its height.43
Van Fraassen has a particularly forceful example of the seeming context dependence of the direc-
tionality of explanation.
4.1. van Fraassen’s tower. While the discussion in section 4 shows that the account is able to
capture the asymmetry of some specific and traditionally troublesome cases, it does not rely on a
relationship built to be asymmetric to do so. This means that it is not ruled out that there can
be both cases where a explains b and ones where b explains a. I think that this is a virtue of the
account. For example, the nature of this solution provides a ready response to van Fraassen’s case
where a tower is constructed specifically to cast a shadow of a certain length at a certain time of
the year.44 Some, including van Fraassen himself, have taken cases like this to cast doubts on the
possibility of giving a both adequate and illuminating analysis of explanation in terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions. Such cases seem to show that even the asymmetry of explanation can
shift with context (since now the length of the shadow can explain the height of the tower after
all). The solution to the non-symmetry problem given in this paper does not demand denying that
there could be any explanation of the height of the tower from the length of the shadow. Rather,
this account only denies that the application of the standard trigonometric relation supports such
a law-based explanation. Even in van Fraassen’s case this seems right. The case that van Fraassen
puts forward is motivated by causal reasoning (although of a complicated kind going through the
43Paul Teller. On Why-Questions. Nouˆs, 8(4):371–380, 1974, pp 378–379.
44Bas van Fraassen. The Scientific Image. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, pp 132–134.
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intentions of those ordering the construction of the tower, etc.). The solution here has not ruled
out an explanatory role for such causal relations.
4.2. Time-symmetric formulations of the laws versus time-symmetric explanations.
Since the account of law-based explanation that I have suggested does not build asymmetry in
by default, it leaves it open whether time-symmetric formulations of laws within our physical the-
ories mandate time-symmetric explanations.45
It is often claimed that while predictions can sometimes also be explanations, retrodictions are
not explanatory.46 On a nomological dependence account of explanation there is no simple answer
to give as to whether retrodictions can be explanatory. Instead the question is bound up with how
we regard the relationship between the formulations of our laws and time. Let me briefly show how
we are left with two options.
The question that we have to answer is whether or not time-symmetric formulations of, say, laws
of fundamental physics give us reason to think that there are laws of nature that guarantee the
dependence of past states on future ones (as well the dependence of future states on past states).
However, as we have seen again and again in this paper, the mere time-symmetric formulation of
the laws does not guarantee symmetry when it comes to explanation. After all, we first have to
decide what the associated conditions of application are. Among the questions that we would have
to settle in order to decide this is whether we take the laws in question to apply to the nature of
time or whether the existence of some particular kind of temporal order is rather a condition of
application of the laws. To illustrate the difference in a dramatic way we can ask whether we take
the laws in question to rule out the possibility of an apocalypse (in the sense of the end of time)
taking place between the past state and the occurrence of some particular future one mandated by
the laws. If we answer yes to that question, we open up for a symmetry of explanation from the
temporal symmetry of the formulation of the laws. However, if we answer no then we do not take
the time-symmetric laws to apply unrestrictedly and to be able to guarantee the dependence of
45I will not discuss whether we should regard specific formulations as time-symmetric since this merits a longer
discussion than this paper allows.
46See for example Barry Loewer. Counterfactuals and the second law. In H. Price and R. Corry, editors, Causation,
Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited, pages 293–326. Oxford University Press, 2007,
p 294.
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past states on future ones (since they fail to guarantee that the past ones would not have existed
had the future ones failed to).47
The upshot of this way of thinking of explanatory non-symmetry in general is that even if we
acknowledge the existence of time-symmetric formulations of laws, it does not immediately follow
that we will also have time-symmetric explanations. This is so even though it can give us reasons
to accept such explanations. We have already seen how we typically have to be careful in noting
any implicit restrictions in application of the laws before trying to read off relations of dependence
from those laws. Figuring out exactly what these restrictions are is by no means a trivial matter,
and it will often involve a rather sophisticated understanding of the whole theory of which the law
is a part. This is, I think, as it should be. As the problem of non-symmetry shows, we cannot
understand what depends on what simply by being told that there is a lawlike connection between
two phenomena.
5. Conclusion
The account of law-based explanation that I have proposed does not fit neatly as a development
of any of the traditional accounts. It is broader than the causal account since not only causal
relations serve as the basis for explanation and for introducing explanatory non-symmetries. It
is narrower than the deductive-nomological account: it is not sufficient for explanation that the
phenomenon to be explained is subsumed under some law.
The account proposed is also different from interventionist accounts, even though it shares the
importance placed on considerations of counterfactual scenarios. Sophisticated interventionist ac-
counts, such as Woodward’s, still employ a solution to the non-symmetry problem that relies
crucially on causal relations.48 However, the motivating intuition of thinking of explanation in
terms of dependence is close to Woodward’s account. It also shares with Woodward’s account an
acknowledgement that laws do not have to apply unrestrictedly in order to do explanatory work.
However, the account that I have outlined does not rely on causal notions to account for these
features.
47For an argument along similar lines, but from a very different starting point see Tim Maudlin. The Metaphysics
Within Physics. Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 4: On the passing of time.
48Although the solution is given in terms of interventions, these are cashed out in causal terms in James Woodward.
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press, 2003, section 3.1.3.
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Finally, although I have defended the view that we can address the problem of explanatory non-
symmetry within a law-based account of explanation, I have not rescued the deductive-nomological
account. How far are the suggestions that I have made here friendly to the sensibilities behind the
deductive-nomological account? The answer is, I think, surprisingly largely so. The account that I
have presented here is metaphysically neutral about the nature of laws and compatible both with
non-Humean primitivism about the laws and Humean reductionism. For someone with Hempel’s49
commitments, projects that make use of counterfactuals, such as mine, can be taken to “. . . shed
light on the concept” although they cannot provide satisfactory explications. This is a feature that
my account shares with causal accounts. How large this cost is depends on how optimistic we are
about there being a successful explication that respects Hempelian strictures.
Of course, the account in this paper is far from a full account of scientific explanation. I have not
addressed probabilistic and statistical explanations at all, nor have I given a comprehensive account
of explanatory relevance, approximations, idealisations, and modelling practices. Nonetheless, I
hope to have shown that the elegance of a causal solution to the problem of explanatory asymmetries
should not lead us to base our investigations of these aspects of explanation on causal foundations
alone.
Taking law-based explanations to be able to provide information about relations of nomological
dependence without relying on causal underpinnings has consequences for debates in philosophy
beyond developing a model of explanation. It affects our understanding of cases where we may
be more confident about having an explanation than we are about having a causal relation: for
example, explanations of the spin of one particle by the spin of the other in certain quantum
mechanical (EPR style) situations. It also has consequences for arguments that use explanatory
connections to argue for the existence of causal ones.50 Lastly, it gives us the start for a framework
for understanding certain disputes about explanatoriness. In addition to denying the truth or the
status as a law of the putative law, one could now also challenge the claim that the law supports the
dependence in question.51 To settle the question we have to take a stance on what the appropriate
49Carl Hempel. Aspects of Scientific Explanations. In Aspects of Scientific Explanations and other Essays in the
Philosophy of Science, pages 331–496. The Free Press, New York, 1965, p 339.
50As we see for example in Harvey Brown. Physical Relativity: Space-time structure from a dynamical perspective.
Oxford University Press, 2005.
51For a clear example of such a strategy see Sheldon Smith. Symmetries and the explanation of conservation laws in
the light of the inverse problem in lagrangian mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39
(2):325–345, 2008.
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conditions of application of the law are, and, on the view in this article, the debate over this is not
explanatorily innocuous.
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